There must be a universal moral law, or else: a) Moral disagreements would make no sense, as we all assume they do. b) All moral criticisms would be meaningless (for example, ‘The Nazis were wrong.’) c) It would be unnecessary to keep promises or treaties, as we all assume that it is. d) We would not make excuses for breaking the moral law, as we all do.
But a universal moral law requires a universal Moral Law Giver, since the Source of it: a) Gives moral commands (as lawgivers do). b) Is interested in our behaviour (as moral persons are).
Further, this universal Moral Law Giver must be absolutely good: a) Otherwise all moral effort would be futile in the long run, since we would be sacrificing our lives for what is not ultimately right. b) The source of all good must be absolutely good, since the standard of all good must be completely good.
Therefore, there must be an absolutely Moral Law Giver.
It is often argued against the moral argument that the moral law is simply an expression of our in-built “herd-instinct”. In response so such an objection, we can point out that if the moral law was just an expression of herd instinct then the herd would always be right. But herd instinct is not always right (and everyone will agree with that). For example, even the actions prompted by nationalism or ‘love’ can be very wrong. If the moral law was the result of herd-instinct, the stronger instinctive impulse in us would always win out. But, as it is, that is not the case; people often choose not to act from instinct in selfless ways that go against the ethic of the herd.
Similarly, it is often said that the moral law is simply social convention, what we learn from parents and schooling. But, not everything learned through society is based purely on social convention. For example, we learn about maths and logic through the social institutions of schools and universities, but few people insist they are merely social conventions.
Importantly too, the moral law is not to be identified with the laws of nature. The laws of nature are descriptive (is) unlike moral laws which are prescriptive (ought). The way things are is not always right. The moral law does not simply describe the reality of things but demands a moral action on our part that often causes us to act against the way things are. We are compelled by the moral law to hate injustice. Just because the government of a country may be causing its people to starve for lack of food and facilities does not make it right. In fact, such actions are criminal. The way something is can be morally wrong. When people act in accordance with their nature (for example, basic appetites for power and so on) they can act in morally wrong ways. Is is not always right. The moral law does not simply describe us as we are but demands we live in accordance with a law that often challenges and contradicts who we are. In that sense, the moral law often contradicts what nature dictates. It transcends biology and as such, is founded on something more profound than merely genetics, survival of the fittest and personal selfishness.
Perhaps the main challenge that can be levelled against the idea that there is a moral law giving God is the argument from evil or injustice in the world. The world is full of violence, hatred, murder, rape, abuse and so on. Does that not contradict the idea that there is a good God who has established moral laws? The answer, in a sense, is simple: the only way the world could possibly be imperfect is if there is an absolutely perfect standard by which it can be judged to be imperfect. Injustice only makes sense if there is an absolute standard of justice to appeal to. Injustice can only be recognised if we have internalised a standard of what is just and unjust. Such a standard is, of course, the moral law. In the same way, if we intuitively recognise the world as being intrinsically imperfect, there must be a standard by which perfection is known. The fact that we recognise evil as evil presupposes a perfect standard of morality. In that sense, the argument from evil, rather than disproving a morally perfect Being, actually presupposes and points to his existence.
Of course, the question of evil is deeply complex and challenging. Ultimately, however, only Christianity is nuanced enough to properly and adequately answer the vexing question of evil. As Lewis writes in Mere Christianity:
“…the problem (of evil) is not simple and the answer is not going to be simple either. What is the problem? A universe that contains much that is obviously bad and apparently meaningless, but containing creatures like ourselves who know that it is bad and meaningless. There are only two views that face all the facts. One is the Christian view that this is a good world that has gone wrong, but still retains the memory of what it ought to have been. The other is the view called Dualism. Dualism means the belief that there are two equal and independent powers at the back of everything, one of them good and the other bad, and that the universe is the battlefield in which they fight out an endless war…”
Lewis goes on to explain that Dualism commits us to the belief that good and bad existed from all eternity, opposing oneanother. What do we mean by calling one a Bad Power and the other a Good Power? We are either saying we prefer one and not the other, or we are saying that one is actually wrong and the other right. It is not purely a matter of what we prefer; the moral categories of bad and good are irrelevant if we are simply going to make a choice between the two on the basis of what suits us. As soon as we are trying to discern which is the Good Power, we are aiming to live in accordance with it, whether it suits us or not. The Good Power would not deserve to be called good if “being good” simply meant joining the side you happened to like. The moment we make a distinction between which of the two powers is actually wrong and which is actually right we are
“…putting into the universe a third thing in addition to the two Powers: some law or standard or rule of good which one of the powers conforms to and the other fails to conform to. But since the two powers are judged by this standard, then this standard, or the Being who made this standard, is farther back and higher than either of them, and He will be the real God. In fact, what we meant by calling them good and bad turns out to be that one of them is in right relation to the ultimate God and the other is in wrong relation to Him.”
In a sense, then, according to Lewis, as soon as we evaluate what is right and wrong, what is good or bad, we are invoking the standard of the moral law that is itself a reflection of the moral nature of God. In calling something good or bad at any time we are judging their right or wrong relation to the ultimate God who is the ground of our being.
It is often argued against the moral argument that the moral law is simply an expression of our in-built “herd-instinct”. In response so such an objection, we can point out that if the moral law was just an expression of herd instinct then the herd would always be right. But herd instinct is not always right (and everyone will agree with that). For example, even the actions prompted by nationalism or ‘love’ can be very wrong. If the moral law was the result of herd-instinct, the stronger instinctive impulse in us would always win out. But, as it is, that is not the case; people often choose not to act from instinct in selfless ways that go against the ethic of the herd.
Similarly, it is often said that the moral law is simply social convention, what we learn from parents and schooling. But, not everything learned through society is based purely on social convention. For example, we learn about maths and logic through the social institutions of schools and universities, but few people insist they are merely social conventions.
Importantly too, the moral law is not to be identified with the laws of nature. The laws of nature are descriptive (is) unlike moral laws which are prescriptive (ought). The way things are is not always right. The moral law does not simply describe the reality of things but demands a moral action on our part that often causes us to act against the way things are. We are compelled by the moral law to hate injustice. Just because the government of a country may be causing its people to starve for lack of food and facilities does not make it right. In fact, such actions are criminal. The way something is can be morally wrong. When people act in accordance with their nature (for example, basic appetites for power and so on) they can act in morally wrong ways. Is is not always right. The moral law does not simply describe us as we are but demands we live in accordance with a law that often challenges and contradicts who we are. In that sense, the moral law often contradicts what nature dictates. It transcends biology and as such, is founded on something more profound than merely genetics, survival of the fittest and personal selfishness.
Perhaps the main challenge that can be levelled against the idea that there is a moral law giving God is the argument from evil or injustice in the world. The world is full of violence, hatred, murder, rape, abuse and so on. Does that not contradict the idea that there is a good God who has established moral laws? The answer, in a sense, is simple: the only way the world could possibly be imperfect is if there is an absolutely perfect standard by which it can be judged to be imperfect. Injustice only makes sense if there is an absolute standard of justice to appeal to. Injustice can only be recognised if we have internalised a standard of what is just and unjust. Such a standard is, of course, the moral law. In the same way, if we intuitively recognise the world as being intrinsically imperfect, there must be a standard by which perfection is known. The fact that we recognise evil as evil presupposes a perfect standard of morality. In that sense, the argument from evil, rather than disproving a morally perfect Being, actually presupposes and points to his existence.
Of course, the question of evil is deeply complex and challenging. Ultimately, however, only Christianity is nuanced enough to properly and adequately answer the vexing question of evil. As Lewis writes in Mere Christianity:
“…the problem (of evil) is not simple and the answer is not going to be simple either. What is the problem? A universe that contains much that is obviously bad and apparently meaningless, but containing creatures like ourselves who know that it is bad and meaningless. There are only two views that face all the facts. One is the Christian view that this is a good world that has gone wrong, but still retains the memory of what it ought to have been. The other is the view called Dualism. Dualism means the belief that there are two equal and independent powers at the back of everything, one of them good and the other bad, and that the universe is the battlefield in which they fight out an endless war…”
Lewis goes on to explain that Dualism commits us to the belief that good and bad existed from all eternity, opposing oneanother. What do we mean by calling one a Bad Power and the other a Good Power? We are either saying we prefer one and not the other, or we are saying that one is actually wrong and the other right. It is not purely a matter of what we prefer; the moral categories of bad and good are irrelevant if we are simply going to make a choice between the two on the basis of what suits us. As soon as we are trying to discern which is the Good Power, we are aiming to live in accordance with it, whether it suits us or not. The Good Power would not deserve to be called good if “being good” simply meant joining the side you happened to like. The moment we make a distinction between which of the two powers is actually wrong and which is actually right we are
“…putting into the universe a third thing in addition to the two Powers: some law or standard or rule of good which one of the powers conforms to and the other fails to conform to. But since the two powers are judged by this standard, then this standard, or the Being who made this standard, is farther back and higher than either of them, and He will be the real God. In fact, what we meant by calling them good and bad turns out to be that one of them is in right relation to the ultimate God and the other is in wrong relation to Him.”
In a sense, then, according to Lewis, as soon as we evaluate what is right and wrong, what is good or bad, we are invoking the standard of the moral law that is itself a reflection of the moral nature of God. In calling something good or bad at any time we are judging their right or wrong relation to the ultimate God who is the ground of our being.
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